Bank Debt Guarantee Programs by McNamara, Christian M. et al.
Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 2 Issue 3 
2020 
Bank Debt Guarantee Programs 





Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Andrew Metrick 
Yale University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, Growth and 
Development Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, and the Public Administration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
McNamara, Christian M.; Feldberg, Greg; Tam, David; and Metrick, Andrew (2020) "Bank Debt Guarantee 
Programs," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 2 : Iss. 3, 71-100. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol2/iss3/26 
This Surveys is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing 
at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Financial Crises by an authorized editor of EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
 
 
Bank Debt Guarantee Programs1,2 
 




Yale Program on Financial Stability Survey  
January 11, 2019; revised October 10, 2020 
 
Abstract 
One of the hallmarks of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was the rapid evaporation of 
the non-deposit, wholesale funding many financial institutions had become increasingly 
reliant upon in the years leading up to the crisis. In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, governments became increasingly concerned about even fundamentally sound 
institutions’ ability to access necessary funding. In response, beginning in October 2008, 
authorities across the globe began introducing guarantee programs enabling institutions to 
issue debt that would be backed by a guarantee from the government in exchange for a 
guarantee fee. While the specific details of these programs varied (sometimes widely in ways 
that allow for interesting comparisons), some version of this basic idea was implemented by 
over twenty countries. The programs saw significant use in the aggregate but were not 
uniformly utilized. They are generally seen as having achieved their objectives but may also 
in certain circumstances have had unintended consequences such as market distortions 
based on flawed fee structures and the crowding out of non-guaranteed debt.   
Keywords: credit guarantee, bond guarantee, debt guarantee, short-term debt, medium-
term debt, wholesale funding
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Introductory note: In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, a color-
coded system is used to highlight particularly noteworthy design features. This 
system is as follows: 
Color Meaning 
BLUE – INTERESTING A design feature that is interesting and that 
policymakers may want to consider. 
Typically, this determination is based on the 
observation that the design feature involves 
a unique way of addressing a challenge 
common to this type of program. Less 
commonly, there will be empirical evidence 
or a widely held consensus that the design 
feature was effective in this context, in 
which case we will describe that evidence or 
consensus.  
YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED A design feature that policymakers should 
exercise caution in considering. Typically, 
this determination is based on the 
observation that the designers of the 
feature later made significant changes to the 
feature with the intention of improving the 
functioning of the program. Less commonly, 
there will be empirical evidence or a widely 
held consensus that the design feature was 
ineffective in this context, in which case we 
will describe that evidence or consensus.   
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I. Overview 
One of the hallmarks of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC) was the rapid evaporation 
of the non-deposit, wholesale funding many financial institutions had become increasingly 
reliant upon in the years leading up to the crisis. Particularly after the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers on September 15, 2008, the issuance levels associated with such funding sources 
collapsed while spreads increased dramatically. (See, e.g., Grande et al. 2011.) Amidst this 
deterioration in financial market conditions, governments became concerned about even 
fundamentally sound institutions’ ability to access necessary funding. 
In response, beginning in October 2008, authorities across the globe began introducing bank 
debt guarantee programs. Sometimes referred to as credit guarantee schemes or 
government guarantees for bank bonds, these programs enabled institutions to issue debt 
that would be backed by a guarantee from the government in exchange for a guarantee fee. 
While the specific details of these programs varied (sometimes widely) by country (as will 
be discussed in Key Design Decisions below), some version of this basic idea was 
implemented by over twenty countries in the months following the Lehman bankruptcy. 
This survey is limited to the examination of broad-based programs for new issuances and 
therefore excludes (a) blanket guarantee programs that covered existing debt (such as the 
Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS) announced by Ireland in September 
2008) and (b) targeted or ad hoc guarantees that were part of rescue packages for individual 
institutions (such as the guarantee enacted on behalf of Dexia by Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
France in October 2008). While these guarantees are not the subject of this survey, in many 
cases their performance helped inform the design of the broad-based guarantee programs 
evaluated here.  
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Table 1 below shows a list of the guarantee programs studied for purposes of this survey.7 





* Denmark introduced an earlier blanket guarantee called the Original Guarantee Scheme that is not 
covered in this survey. Ireland introduced an earlier blanket guarantee called the CIFS on September 
30, 2008, that is not covered in this survey.  
Source: Author analysis. 
 
As the announcement dates in Table 1 suggest, there were significant international efforts 
made to align state-level responses. The impetus for this began with Ireland’s announcement 
of CIFS on September 30, 2008. This put pressure on UK banks in particular, and the United 
Kingdom responded with the announcement of its Credit Guarantee Scheme on October 8th.  
This caused the European Union (EU) to recognize the need for action and coordination, and 
the European Commission (EC) used its preexisting powers to address potential 
anticompetitive effects of state-level government action to promote much broader goals—
responding to the immediate financial stability issues created by the crisis, promoting a 
consistent response across countries, and imposing restructuring obligations on 
systemically important institutions that needed aid.   
Two significant pieces of EC guidance shaped the way Member states designed their 
programs (as will be discussed in Key Design Decisions below). In a series of documents 
released in October 2008, European governments established principles that guarantee 
programs had to adhere to in order to comply with State aid rules. These included principles 
governing eligible institutions, eligible debt, program duration, guarantee fees and other 
requirements for participation (European Commission 2008, Euro Summit 2008, ECB 
2008).8 Later guidance issued in April 2010 outlined further specifications for countries 
 
7 Programs were also announced in Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These programs 
are currently not included in this study but may be added in future versions.  
8 Euro area heads of state held their first Euro Summit on October 12, 2008, at which they agreed on 
principles for addressing the financial crisis (Euro Summit 2008). Those principles were further elaborated 
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intending to maintain programs beyond June 30, 2010, once markets had stabilized 
somewhat and there was a resulting desire to tighten terms to encourage banks to seek 
private, nonguaranteed funding (European Commission 2010). These specifications 
concerned increased guarantee fees and a requirement that banks reliant on government 
guarantees submit viability plans for the EC’s review. As will be discussed more below, the 
EC’s guidelines were not only largely followed by European countries adopting programs, 
but also influenced program design in countries outside the EU. 
In general, the countries introducing guarantee programs did so with the stated purpose of 
ensuring that their financial institutions had continued access to short- and medium-term 
funding. Often there was also a stated desire by a country to avoid its institutions being put 
at a competitive disadvantage. In some instances, this competitive consideration even 
appears to have been the primary motivation. Canada, for example, in announcing the 
Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility (CLAF) on October 23, 2008, described its purpose as 
“ensur[ing] that financial institutions in this country are not put at a competitive 
disadvantage when raising funds in wholesale markets given similar actions recently 
announced by other countries.” 
Given the global breakdown in banks’ access to funding and the widespread adoption of 
guarantee programs during the GFC, the decision of certain jurisdictions not to adopt 
programs also merits consideration. A main factor appears to have been the dominance of 
domestic banking systems by foreign banks that received support from their home countries. 
The Czech Republic, for example, determined that a program wasn’t necessary given that (a) 
its banks were subsidiaries of foreign banks, (b) those subsidiaries were funded mostly with 
domestic deposits, and (c) regulations restricted the foreign banks from transferring 
liquidity to their foreign parents.9  
The guarantee programs introduced during the GFC saw significant use in the aggregate, but 
were not uniformly utilized. Between October 2008 and May 2010 (by which time 
guaranteed issuances had slowed and many programs were no longer active), nearly 1,400 
guaranteed bonds representing more than €1 trillion were issued by approximately 200 
banks in 17 countries (Levy and Schich 2010). Guaranteed bond issuance began slowly in 
October and November of 2008, as programs became operational and most usage was 
limited to Europe. By December 2008, bond issuance pursuant to the United States Debt 
Guarantee Program began and dramatically increased monthly usage figures. (Panetta et al. 
2009). As indicated in Figure 1 below, usage remained heavy in early 2009 before falling 
sharply in May of that year and remaining much lower from that point onward.   
 
by the European Central Bank on October 20 (ECB 2008) and by the European Commission on October 25 (EC 
2008) in describing how it would implement state aid rules to address measures taken by national 
governments during the crisis. 
9 Financial Stability Report 2008/2009, Czech National Bank. 
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Source: Levy and Schich 2010. 
These figures include only bonds and thus understate the total amount of guaranteed debt 
issued in the United States, which (as discussed in Key Design Decisions below) included a 
wider scope of debt in its program (particularly initially) than many others. Although 
guaranteed bond issuance in the United States did not begin until December 2008, issuance 
of other guaranteed debt including three-month debt, interbank lending, and commercial 
paper began right away and exceeded European bond issuances in October and November. 
The composition of issuers making use of guarantee programs varied over time. The average 
credit rating of banks issuing guaranteed debt in the second half of 2009 (by which point 
market conditions had begun to improve) was significantly lower than the average credit 
rating of banks issuing guaranteed debt from October 2008 to April 2009 (Levy and Schich 
2010).    
Table 2 below lists the amount of guaranteed issuances under each program. The United 
States, Germany, and the United Kingdom saw the highest usage in absolute terms, but 
trailed countries such as Ireland and Greece in terms of usage as a percentage of GDP.   
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Amounts reflect the guaranteed debt issued during the course of the programs’ existence. 
Figures expressed as approximations were converted to euros from other currencies based on 
exchange rates as of October 2008. 
Source: Author analysis. 
 
Another difference is the extent to which program usage was widespread across many 
financial institutions versus concentrated among a few significant issuers. Figure 2 below 
compares the share of total guaranteed issuance accounted for by the two largest borrowers 
in each country. As Figure 2 illustrates, guaranteed issuance in Germany and the United 
Kingdom was far more concentrated than in the United States and Australia. 





Source: Grande et al. 2011. 
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As indicated in Table 2, programs in several countries were not used at all. Several potential 
factors may have contributed to this lack of activity: 
• The fact that a country adopted its program for competitive purposes rather than 
based on a perceived need for the guarantees among financial institutions (as was the 
case, for example, in Canada) 
• The amount of the participation fees charged to issuers of guaranteed bonds 
potentially being too high relative to the benefit that the guarantee provided (as will 
be discussed more below and may have been the case in countries including Italy, 
Hungary, and Poland) 
• The conditions for participation potentially having been too restrictive/stigmatizing 
(as will be discussed more below and may have been the case in countries including 
Belgium) 
• The fact that other programs in existence at the same time offered better terms (as 
may have been the case with the United Kingdom’s Asset-Back Securities Guarantee 
Scheme) 
A final consideration with respect to usage is the extent to which institutions that did make 
use of guarantees also participated in other government interventions. Panetta et al. (2009) 
analyzed a sample of 85 financial institutions receiving government assistance. Around half 
of the sample (44 institutions) had received capital injections while three-quarters (64 
institutions) had issued guaranteed debt. Half of the 44 institutions receiving capital 
injections also issued guaranteed debt. Perhaps most interestingly, banks receiving larger 
capital injections also seem to have issued more guaranteed debt.     
II. Key Design Decisions 
Related Programs  
Given their adoption in late 2008/early 2009 at the height of the crisis, it is perhaps not 
surprising that many of the guarantee programs studied were not introduced in isolation but 
rather formed one component of broader packages. These packages included measures like 
asset purchase programs, bank recapitalizations, deposit insurance expansions and 
emergency liquidity facilities.  
The existence of related programs influenced eligibility for guarantee programs in certain 
countries. In the United Kingdom, eight major institutions participating in a related bank 
recapitalization program became eligible for the Credit Guarantee Scheme automatically—
all other banks had to apply for inclusion. New Zealand required institutions participating in 
its guarantee program to also participate in a related deposit insurance program. In the 
United States, the government told at least the nine major financial institutions receiving the 
initial capital injections made available through the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) that 
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participation in the Debt Guarantee Program and CPP were linked. As noted above, greater 
participation in related programs such as recapitalization schemes may also be linked with 
greater issuance of guaranteed debt. The interplay between capital injections and guarantee 
programs in particular is perhaps not surprising given that there does not appear to be an 
example of a jurisdiction that successfully addressed a failing banking system through the 
use of a guarantee alone. Rather, guarantees combined with recapitalization programs seem 
to have been necessary. 
Legal Authority  
The legal authority pursuant to which the guarantees adopted during the GFC were put into 
place varied by country. Certain jurisdictions required additional legislation or executive 
rulemaking, while other jurisdictions relied on standing authority, as can be seen in Table 3 
below. A hybrid category of three countries (Australia, Canada, and Finland) possessed 
standing authority to establish guarantee programs but required legislative action to 
establish program size or authorize funding. Programs adopted in EU countries also required 
the approval of the EC as being compatible with EU restrictions on State aid contained in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). To evaluate the guarantee 
programs that began appearing in October of 2008, the EC refined its approach to state aid 
in response to the intensifying crisis. The EC relied on a different provision in the TFEU than 
what was typically utilized under its classical approach, in order to consider actions 
necessary to remedy a “serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State.” This change 
“enabled the Commission to act in a coordinated and consistent way… and to take its 
decisions quicker” (European Commission 2011). The need to structure programs in such a 
way as to ensure EC approval significantly influenced the design decisions made by EU 
countries (as will be seen in the discussion of additional Key Design Decisions below). 





Source: Author analysis. 
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Two countries in which additional legislative action was required relied on secondary 
sources of authority in order to implement their programs immediately while that action 
was still pending. In Canada, the Minister of Finance announced the CLAF prior to the 
Canadian Parliament having authorized payments under the guarantee (as would be 
required by Canadian law for such payments to be made). To allow for such payments in the 
interim, the legal documentation for the CLAF provided that “alternative purchase 
commitments” could be used for funding. Under these “alternative purchase commitments,” 
the Minister of Finance would use his or her authority to buy assets to purchase any 
guaranteed debt that went into default for a price equal to the amount owed pursuant to the 
guarantee. The holders of the guaranteed debt would thus receive this purchase price in 
satisfaction of their claims under the CLAF. 
In South Korea, new legislation was needed to establish the State Guarantee of External Debt 
of Korean Banks. The Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank assumed responsibility 
for providing guarantees until this new legislation passed. Following the adoption of the 
authorizing legislation, responsibility for any guarantees provided by these entities would 
be transferred to the Minister of Finance.  
Program Size  
The programs studied adopted a variety of approaches to the question of how much 
guaranteed debt could be issued pursuant thereto. As illustrated in Table 4 below, a number 
of programs had no specified cap (and thus theoretically could involve unlimited issuances, 
although, as discussed in Limitations on Participation below, there were often caps on the 
amounts that could be issued by individual institutions). Other countries adopted specific 
sizes based on such factors as expected usage (e.g., the United Kingdom) or the amount of 
debt maturing during a given timeframe (e.g., South Korea). 





Amounts reflect the largest program size established during the course of the programs’ 
existence, not necessarily the amount announced upon introduction. Figures expressed as 
approximations were converted to euros from other currencies based on exchange rates as of 
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October 2008. * Ireland’s EC state aid decision references a maximum issuance amount, but the 
figure is redacted as confidential.  
Source: Author analysis. 
 
The maximum size of some programs fluctuated over time, whether up because of increased 
need or down because of reduced need and/or a desire to reduce potential exposure. The 
following changes from announced program size occurred: 
• Portugal increased its program from an initial €20B to €35B 
• Spain increased its program from an initial €100B to €164B 
• Finland reduced its program from an initial €50B to €17B 
• Poland increase its program from an initial ~€14B to ~€56B 
• Austria reduced its IBSG program from an initial €75B to €50B 
• Greece increased its program from an initial €15B to €93B  
Eligible Institutions  
A key question in designing guarantee programs is who will be eligible to participate in them. 
Each of the programs studied defined categories of institutions that were eligible to 
participate. Banks were always eligible as seen in Table 5 below. Less often eligible were 
insurance companies and other nonbank financial institutions (most commonly mortgage 
companies in countries other than the United States). Countries generally imposed a 
requirement that institutions be solvent to be eligible. ECB guidelines issued on October 20, 
2008, called for guarantees to target “liquidity constrained solvent banks.” Subsequent EC 
guidance on October 25, 2008, relaxed this approach, explicitly contemplating that 
guarantees could be used to “keep [an] insolvent institution afloat” as long as steps were 
subsequently taken to restructure or liquidate the institution. Nevertheless, solvency seems 
to have been a consistent requirement for eligible institutions.    
Many programs imposed additional eligibility requirements having to do with such factors 
as capital (i.e., specific required levels beyond general solvency requirement), credit rating, 
prior issuance, volume of lending, liquidity, market share/size of domestic operations, and 
systemic importance. In almost all countries, subsidiaries of foreign banks were eligible to 
participate on the same terms as domestic banks. Australia and New Zealand were unique in 
also allowing foreign branches to participate, albeit on heavily restricted terms. The 
justification cited by authorities for differential treatment of foreign branches versus foreign 
subsidiaries was typically that the former, not being incorporated and independently 
capitalized in the relevant jurisdictions, were not subject to the same degree of oversight and 
control as the latter.   
The United States adopted a unique opt-out structure pursuant to which eligible institutions 
were automatically enrolled in the program unless they made a non-reversible decision to 
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opt-out by a specified date. The FDIC intended the opt-out structure and the non-reversible 
nature of the decision to opt-out to promote broad participation even among healthy 
institutions. Such a healthy institution might be reluctant to opt-out not knowing whether 
conditions would worsen in the future, necessitating later use of the guarantee program.  
The exception to the above opt-out framework in the United States was certain nonbank 
financial institutions (NBFIs) that were required to apply to the FDIC for eligibility, which 
would be granted in the FDIC’s sole discretion based on factors including the size and 
financial strength of the organization. The FDIC, whose historical mandate and experience 
revolved around the protection of insured depository institutions, had initially sought to 
limit the program to such institutions. The Treasury and Federal Reserve argued for the 
inclusion of a broad range of nonbank financial institutions. Ultimately, those eligible for the 
Debt Guarantee Program included insured depository institutions and bank and financial 
holding companies. The inclusion of holding companies stemmed from the observation that 
the senior unsecured debt covered by the DGP was typically issued at the holding company 
level in most holding company structures, with the holding companies then providing 
liquidity to their depository institution subsidiaries.  
The range of NBFIs eligible for participation in the Debt Guarantee Program was more 
expansive than the range in other countries (which was often limited to mortgage 
companies), and NBFI General Electric Capital Corporation ended up being among the Debt 
Guarantee Program’s most active issuers. NBFIs that issued guaranteed debt outside the U.S. 
included LeasePlan Corp. N.V., a fleet management company held mainly by Volkswagen 
Group, in the Netherlands; and Volvofinans Bank AB, in Sweden. In the United Kingdom, 
specialized lenders were excluded from the Asset-Backed Securities Guarantee Scheme 
despite their importance to that market, likely contributing to a lack of use. In Germany, 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) were eligible to issue guaranteed debt in order to enable 
financial institutions to transfer troubled assets to such SPVs in exchange for government 
guaranteed debt.  
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B = banks, I = insurance companies, NBFI = other nonbank financial institutions, FOR = foreign 
subsidiaries; Institutions coded as eligible only if explicitly identified as such in program 
documents and/or appearing in usage results for program. 
CAP = capital requirements (beyond “solvency”), CR = credit rating requirements, ISS = prior 
issuance requirements, LEND = lending requirements, LIQ = liquidity requirements, MARK = 
market share/size of domestic operations requirements, SI = systemic importance 
requirements. 
Source: Author analysis. 
 
There is some evidence that initial eligibility requirements may have been seen by potential 
participants as too stringent in certain countries, given their subsequent relaxation. In 
Hungary, an initial requirement that participants have regulatory capital in an amount that 
limited participation to Hungary’s largest banks was later removed. Sweden changed its 
initial capital requirement from 6% Tier 1 and 9% combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 to be 8% 
combined Tier 1 and Tier 2 only.  In Ireland, on the other hand, eligibility became more 
restricted over time as certain foreign subsidiaries of Irish banks were ultimately removed 
from the Irish program given their pre-existing coverage in host jurisdictions.   
Eligible Debt  
Type 
In general, the programs studied guaranteed new, senior, unsecured debt of specified 
maturities (such maturities discussed below). In describing the types of debt that should be 
eligible for participation in guarantee programs, the EC’s guidance of October 25, 2008, 
encapsulates the approach that seems to have been adopted by most jurisdictions: “the 
selection of the types of debt and liabilities covered must be targeted, to the extent 
practicable, to the specific source of difficulties and restricted to what can be considered 
necessary to confront the relevant aspects of the current financial crisis,” with subordinated 
debt and “indiscriminate coverage of all liabilities” not included because “it would merely 
tend to safeguard the interests of shareholders and other risk capital investors.”  
Two exceptions to this typical policy of focusing on senior unsecured debt merit 
consideration. First, several (mostly European) countries weighed whether or not to include 
covered bonds within the scope of their guarantee programs. In Denmark, an Original 
Guarantee Scheme launched on October 10, 2008, provided blanket coverage of almost all 
senior unsecured debt, explicitly excluding covered bonds. Sweden and Finland, in later 
introducing their own guarantee schemes in late October 2008, cited a perceived drying up 
of the covered bond market as a result of this exclusion in successfully lobbying the EC for 
approval to include covered bonds in the Swedish and Finnish programs.10 Denmark itself 
launched a New Guarantee Scheme in early February 2009 that included covered bonds. New 
 
10 The EC characterized Finland’s position, for example, as follows: “The Finnish authorities submit that their  
guarantee needs to include covered bonds because the experience in Denmark, where they were excluded, 
has shown that in their view this market would dry up without the guarantee” (State Aid N 567/2008 – 
Finland Guarantee scheme for banks' funding in Finland, November 13, 2008). 
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Zealand and Germany also included covered bonds in their programs, and Italy and Portugal 
eventually added covered bonds over the course of their respective programs as conditions 
changed.11  
In approving the inclusion of covered bonds, the EC generally made note of some or all of the 
following factors: 
• The fact that covered bonds, although already collateralized, could be “shunned” 
given market failures if not guaranteed  
• The importance of covered bonds to the respective financial systems (e.g., “over 
80% of Swedish housing loans are packaged in the form of covered bonds”) 
• Design features limiting the total issuance of guaranteed covered bonds relative 
to the overall size of the programs (typically to one-third) 
A second potential exception involved the inclusion of interbank deposits. Guidance from the 
ECB issued on October 20, 2008, called for such deposits to be excluded from guarantee 
programs, as the ECB had existing programs addressing illiquidity in the interbank market 
in its role as lender of last resort (Euro Summit 2008). Spain initially contemplated including 
interbank deposits in its program but ultimately did not do so. Belgium appears to have 
included interbank deposits despite the ECB’s guidance and a subsequent recommendation 
from the ECB directly to the Belgian government that these deposits be excluded. Interbank 
deposits were included in the U.S. program and issued with the guarantee in moderate 
amounts in the early months of the program and the following spring.  
The widespread decision to limit programs to new debt merits consideration, particularly 
given that certain jurisdictions introduced blanket guarantees covering existing debt before 
switching to guarantees focused on new debt instead. Denmark’s Original Guarantee Scheme 
included existing debt before the government replaced it with the New Guarantee Scheme 
focused on newly issued debt. In Ireland, the blanket guarantee on existing debt established 
by the CIFS gave way to the Credit Institutions (Eligible Liabilities Guarantee) Scheme’s 
coverage of newly issued debt. In the United States, proposals to include existing debt were 
made with the belief that excluding such debt would leave its holders worried about haircuts 
and defaults.12 The FDIC objected to this approach, however, on the basis that existing 
debtholders had already made their decisions to purchase debt with no expectation of a 
guarantee. It thus limited the Debt Guarantee Program to newly issued debt.    
 
 
11 In addition to those programs that included covered bonds, the United Kingdom launched a guarantee 
program specifically for asset-backed securities and programs in Germany and Greece allowed for guaranteed 
debt to be backed by collateral with a 25-basis-point reduction in the guarantee fee.  
12 Another related approach proposed was to guarantee existing debt but only in the event of default (i.e. 
preannounce that the creditors of a failing bank would be protected). 
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Maturities 
The guarantee programs introduced during the GFC were concerned primarily with meeting 
the short- and medium-term financing needs of banks and adopted approaches to eligible 
maturities that matched this objective. Each of the programs studied had a maximum 
guarantee duration of between three years and five years (with the five-year maximum being 
available in some countries only under exceptional circumstances)13. One notable difference 
in approaches was how this maximum guarantee duration was achieved. In most countries 
only debt with maturities of up to three years (or five years) could be issued with a 
guarantee. The guarantee would then last until the debt matured. A minority approach 
adopted only in Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States placed no 
maximum maturity on guaranteed debt, but the guarantee would only last for a specified 
portion of the debt’s life. Thus, under such a program a 30-year bond could be issued that 
would only be guaranteed for its first five years. 
On the minimum end, the existence of other government emergency and market liquidity 
programs to address overnight and very short-term borrowing resulted in the broad 
adoption of three months or 90 days as the shortest maturity eligible (Canada, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden). This minimum 
was also consistent with ECB guidance that short-term debt with maturities of less than 
three months not be included in guarantee programs.  
Several other jurisdictions (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, 
New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom) had no specified minimum. In the 
United States, which initially had no minimum, the FDIC later imposed a 31-day minimum 
maturity because disruptions were less serious in very short-term money markets as a result 
of other government efforts, and it wanted to concentrate the Debt Guarantee Program on 
“help[ing] institutions to obtain stable, longer-term sources of funding where liquidity is 
currently most lacking.”14  Similarly, Finland ultimately increased its minimum maturity 
from 90 days to 12 months.     
Currencies 
Over half of the programs studied allowed guaranteed debt to be issued in all currencies. 
Several other programs included one or more currencies in addition to the jurisdiction’s 
own. This was sometimes accompanied by a fixed surcharge on foreign currency issuances 
(Canada—20bps for non-Canadian currencies) or at least the discretion to impose additional 
fees to compensate for foreign exchange risk. 
In the United Kingdom, a limited list of eligible currencies (sterling, euros, and U.S. dollars) 
was later expanded to include Australian dollars, Canadian dollars, Swiss francs, and yen for 
 
13 Maximum maturities were typically set at three years when programs first launched, but several 
jurisdictions including Portugal, the Netherlands, Finland, Spain, and Germany later extended the maximum 
to five years. Portugal and Italy later extended maximum maturities to seven years for covered bonds.  
14 Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program; Final Rule 12 CFR Part 370, November 26, 2008.  
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the explicit purpose of broadening the investor base for British banks. South Korea’s State 
Guarantee of External Debt of Korean Banks was unique in limiting its program to foreign 
currencies only, given South Korea’s concern that it was access to external funding that was 
most at risk during the GFC.   
Participation Limits for Individual Firms   
The belief that guarantee programs should enable institutions to meet existing refinancing 
needs rather than fuel further growth at the expense of non-beneficiary banks, prompted 
many jurisdictions to place caps on the amount of guaranteed debt that a given institution 
could issue. As stated in the EC’s guidance of October 25, 2008, “[t]he limitation of the 
amount of the guarantee available…may also be an element safeguarding the proportionality 
of the scheme.” A typical approach was to measure the amount of outstanding debt maturing 
within a specified, near-term timeframe and then add a bit of a cushion (often 25%) and to 
use the resulting figure as the cap. The different approaches to participation limits for 
individual firms can be summarized as follows: 
• No cap: Australia, Austria – OeCAG, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom – ABS Guarantee Scheme 
• Cap based on maturing liabilities: Canada (alternatively, Canadian deposits), 
Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden (alternatively, public 
deposits), United States 
• Cap based on other measures: Austria - IBSG (criteria unclear), France (balance 
sheet size), Greece (liquidity, market share, maturities, and lending to small and 
medium enterprises), Italy (supervisory capital), Spain (domestic market share), 
United Kingdom – Credit Guarantee Scheme (sterling deposit liabilities) 
The cap on guaranteed issuances by individual institutions was particularly important in the 
United States. Per the terms of the Debt Guarantee Program, institutions could not issue non-
guaranteed debt until the cap was reached. The one exception to this prohibition required 
firms to make a declaration of intention to issue non-guaranteed debt by a specified date and 
pay a 37.5bps fee on outstanding senior unsecured debt within a specified maturity range. 
The stated rationale for this restriction was the reduction of adverse selection—the concern 
that an institution would issue only risky types of debt under the guarantee.   
Fees 
Each of the programs studied charged participants a fee for the guarantees provided. The 
major points of differentiation between programs on the subject of fees involved whether or 
not fees would be based on the credit risk of the individual participants and, if so, how risk 
would be measured. As shown in Table 6 below, the vast majority of programs charged risk-
based fees. The United States, in adopting the minority approach, specifically considered 
introducing a risk-based fee but opted not to for practical reasons. The FDIC felt that it lacked 
the time and, in the case of guarantee-eligible participants not normally under the FDIC’s 
jurisdiction, the authorization/expertise to effectively assess differential risk.  
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Source: Author analysis. 
As Table 6 illustrates, a large number of European jurisdictions (but not all European 
jurisdictions) adopted a risk-based approach to fees that utilized the CDS (credit default 
swap) spreads of participating institutions. This convergence occurred as a result of the 
guidance issued by the ECB on October 20, 2008, that recommended that annualized 
guarantee fees be based on the following principles (ECB 2008): 
• Debt with maturities of one year or less should be charged a flat fee equal to 50 basis 
points “as CDS spreads may not provide an adequate measure of credit risk for such 
debt” 
• Debt with maturities exceeding one year should be charged a fee based on CDS 
spreads (which “provide a good reference to ensure that governments get a fair 
compensation and to minimise market distortions”) and an add-on fee equal to 50 
basis points (“to recover the operational costs and to help preserve the level playing 
field”) 
• The CDS spreads used should be median five-year CDS spreads (“the most liquid 
CDS instruments”) for a reference period from January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008 
(to “reduc[e] the impact of extremely high CDS values that emerged especially in 
[September and October 2008]”) 
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• Institutions without CDS data should use an equivalent CDS spread based on 
similarly rated institutions  
The specific formula that results from these principles can be expressed as: 
Annualized Fee = 50bps + [for debt with maturity greater than one year] median five-
year CDS spread from January 1, 2007, to August 31, 2008 
The majority of countries listed in Table 6 as adopting CDS-based fees initially followed this 
base formula.15 Further EC guidance issued on April 30, 2010, required that programs 
extended beyond June 30, 2010, increase their fees from the ECB’s base formula by at least 
20bps to 40bps based on the credit rating of the participating institution to “promote a 
gradual phasing out of guarantee schemes.” EU countries with programs running beyond this 
date thus ultimately adopted fee increases. 
Even with this ECB-driven convergence many jurisdictions adopted unique elements in their 
approach to fees. Finland adopted a 5bps surcharge for institutions whose Tier 1 capital fell 
below 7%. Italy levied a 50bps surcharge (imposed after 24 months) on debt with maturities 
exceeding two years. Multiple jurisdictions (Greece, Finland, and Sweden) reduced the add-
on fee from 50bps to 25bps when guaranteeing covered bonds or when collateralized.  In the 
United States, a 10bps surcharge applied to certain nonbank financial institutions. In the 
United Kingdom, the repurchase of guaranteed debt by issuers was initially prohibited and 
then later subjected to a surcharge equal to 15% of the fee that would otherwise have been 
due.    
For countries adopting a minority (i.e., non-risk-based or credit-ratings-based) position on 
fees, there was a greater diversity of approaches. Non-risk-based fees could either be a flat 
annualized fee (100bps for South Korea and 100bps plus a 70bps setup fee for Belgium) or 
an annualized fee range based on maturity (50bps to 100bps for the United States initially 
and later 50bps to 150bps for debt issued beginning April 1, 2009). Similarly, for countries 
that relied on credit ratings, fees could either involve an annualized range based on those 
ratings (70bps to 150bps for Australia, 85bps to 250bps initially for New Zealand) or a flat 
fee with a surcharge for issuers below a certain ratings threshold (160bps plus a 25bps 
surcharge below A3/A-/A- initially for Canada).   
Notwithstanding this diversity of approaches, it is interesting to note the extent to which 
most programs’ fees were similar. Levy and Schich (2010) note that average fees across 
jurisdictions were mostly near 100bps, with Germany at the low end of this clustering with 
an average fee of 91bps, and the United Kingdom on the high end with an average fee of 
114bps.  
 
15 The two that diverged were France (with an add-on fee of only 20bps) and the United Kingdom (which 
used a different reference period from July 2, 2007, to July 1, 2008). 
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The correct pricing of guarantees can be both complicated and essential to the success of the 
program. Not surprisingly, therefore, an analysis of the programs studied reveals numerous 
decisions for designing fees that appear to have been problematic. This can be suggested 
either by the fact that the decision was later amended (often with an explanation for the 
amendment that spells out what went wrong), or by the fact that the result of the decision 
was the opposite of the stated rationale for having made it. The prime example in the latter 
category, and perhaps the biggest example of a flawed fee design decision, concerns the 
ECB’s attempt to maintain a level playing field by promoting identical fee structures across 
countries. As discussed in more detail in Evaluation below, the most significant factor in 
determining how much a government guarantee will reduce spreads and improve borrowing 
costs for issuers is the creditworthiness of the sovereign making the guarantee. Given that 
sovereign creditworthiness varied considerably across countries, similarly situated issuers 
from different jurisdictions ended up paying the same fees for guarantees with dramatically 
different values. This resulted in a variety of distortions and several programs that remained 
unused given the low value of their sovereigns’ guarantees relative to the fees charged, as 
further discussed in Evaluations. To address this issue, either the value of the guarantees 
across countries must be made consistent (e.g., by using a multi-lateral body to provide 
them) if fee structures remain uniform, or fee structures must stop being uniform (e.g., by 
having “weak” sovereigns charge less than “strong” sovereigns) if the value of the guarantees 
provided remains inconsistent. Neither solution is without political difficulty. (See, e.g., Levy 
and Schich 2010 and Grande et al. 2011.) 
During the GFC, there were also several examples of countries that lowered fees that had 
come to be seen as prohibitively high. In the United States, the FDIC abandoned an initial flat 
fee of 75bps for a range of 50bps to 100bps (later 150bps given surcharges for debt issued 
beginning April 1, 2009) based on maturity due to concerns that 75bps was too high for 
short-term debt. Canada’s initial fee of 160bps plus a 25bps surcharge for institutions rated 
below A3/A-/A- was replaced by a fee of 110bps plus the surcharge to make the CLAF more 
competitive. New Zealand repeatedly lowered its fees from a range of 85bps to 250bps to a 
range of 70bps to 200bps to better match market conditions. In 2012, Portugal calculated 
the fee for three large banks based on the CDS spreads from a sample of other EU banks in 
light of the belief that Portuguese sovereign spreads were artificially inflating its banks’ CDS.    
Other Conditions 
The additional conditions placed on participants in guarantee programs is another area in 
which the need for EC approval influenced many countries’ design decisions. The October 
25, 2008, guidance on guarantee programs issued by the EC called for the inclusion in 
programs of a set of safeguards “to minimize…distortions and the potential abuse of the 
preferential situations of beneficiaries brought about by a State guarantee” and “to avoid 
moral hazard.” This guidance did not specify exactly what safeguards a program should 
include, but required “an adequate combination” of elements including restrictions on 
advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet growth, share buybacks, and executive 
compensation. As indicated in Table 7 below, some of these elements were incorporated into 
programs adopted in most EU countries. 
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ADV – advertising, BUY – share buybacks, COMP – executive compensation, DIV – dividends, 
GROW – growth, LEND – minimum lending requirements. 
Source: Author analysis. 
 
A number of jurisdictions also adopted unique requirements for participation as follows: 
• Germany – participating institutions had to review their business models, with risky 
lines of business subject to divestiture or reduction at the direction of the government 
• Hungary – participating institutions had to issue a veto share enabling the 
government to block certain corporate actions like dividend payments, compensation 
payments, etc. 
• United Kingdom (Credit Guarantee Scheme) – participating institutions had to submit 
a plan for accessing wholesale funding without benefit of a guarantee 
The participation requirements associated with guarantee programs were, in general, less 
stringent than those associated with capital injection and/or asset purchase programs in 
many countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, a set of conditions including 
compensation restrictions, lending commitments, and support for mortgage assistant 
programs imposed on participants in the Bank Recapitalisation Fund did not generally apply 
to the Credit Guarantee Scheme but could be imposed on a case-by-case basis. 
Recapitalization programs in the United States and Germany similarly imposed restrictions 
not included in the guarantee programs in those countries.  
Still, there is reason to believe that the adoption of certain conditions may have discouraged 
participation or at least been seen as having the potential to do so. Multiple jurisdictions 
ultimately abandoned conditions that they had considered or initially implemented. In the 
Netherlands, initial open-ended restrictions on compensation were later replaced with 
specific guidelines. Finland eliminated proposed restrictions on balance-sheet growth and 
share buybacks prior to adoption. Sweden, likewise, ultimately eliminated restrictions on 
balance-sheet growth. Meanwhile, Belgium appears to have had broad discretion to impose 
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conditions of an uncertain nature and saw no usage of its guarantee program, perhaps as a 
result.   
At the same time, several countries retained similar restrictions and still attracted 
participants to their guarantee programs. Participants in Denmark’s program, in particular, 
appear to have been relatively heavily restricted, yet its opt-in New Guarantee Scheme was 
nonetheless widely utilized.  
Process for Exercising Guarantee 
As discussed in greater detail in the Evaluation section below, the timeliness of payment 
upon exercising the guarantee in the event of default has a significant effect on determining 
how much a government guarantee will reduce spreads and improve borrowing costs for 
issuers. The empirical evidence in support of this conclusion is bolstered by examples of 
countries that shifted from delayed to more immediate payments.  In Canada, an initial 
proposal called for a 30-day waiting period between the demand for payment by guarantee 
beneficiaries and the actual payment. Canada abandoned this approach in favor of “timely 
payment” standard. In the United States, the FDIC originally said that it would only make 
payments pursuant to the DGP upon an issuing institution declaring bankruptcy. This 
position was later replaced with a policy that payment could be triggered by the first default. 
There were also countries that took specific steps to ensure timely payment. France required 
debt payments to be deposited at the Bank of France several days before due to provide early 
warning of any impending defaults.16  
These approaches appear to have been in the minority, however. As illustrated in Figure 3 
below, many jurisdictions had significant waiting periods before failure to pay could result 
in their guarantees being exercised.  
 
16 As a practical matter, this arrangement was made much easier by the fact that banks’ debt payments were 
owed to the SFEF clearing SPV rather than to bondholders. 
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Source: Panetta et al. 2009. 
The programs studied also contain examples of unique, problematic requirements on default 
that were preemptively addressed or later abandoned: 
• Finland – participating mortgage banks were required to transfer guaranteed 
mortgages to the state if the guarantee was triggered. This transfer was legally 
impossible to accomplish and was later repealed.  
• Portugal – if a bank defaulted and called on a guarantee, the bank would be required 
to either pay back the Portuguese state or exchange that obligation for preference 
shares. Later, the ability of the state to become a shareholder pursuant to the 
guarantee program was limited. 
• Spain – under existing Spanish law, payments could not be made under the guarantee 
until the defaulting institution demonstrated that it lacked the property to make 
payment. The Spanish government waived this “beneficium excussionis” in 
connection with its guarantee program.  
Additional points for consideration are the sources from which funds would be drawn in the 
event that guaranteed debt defaulted and countries were required to make payments 
pursuant to their programs. As noted above, each of the programs studied charged 
participants guarantee fees that could be used to meet guarantee obligations. In the event 
that these fees proved insufficient, most jurisdictions appear to have relied on the 
government’s general ability to make payments. There were two major exceptions to this 
general approach. 
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A small number of countries established pre-funded pools of money to back their guarantee 
programs. Hungary created an approximately €1.1 billion Refinancing Guarantee Fund in 
connection with its €20 billion aid package from the IMF and ECB. The Hungarian 
government intended this €1.1 billion Fund to support up to approximately €5.5 billion in 
guaranteed issuances. Germany established a new €480 billion fund called SoFFin to issue 
guarantees, purchase assets, and inject capital, with €400 billion of this total earmarked 
specifically for guarantees. In Sweden, the government set up a stability fund (discussed 
below) to finance its efforts in support of the financial system.   
A second exception involves countries that sought to have the banking sector fund their 
guarantee programs even beyond the contribution of participation fees. In the United States, 
the FDIC sought to make its Debt Guarantee Program completely industry-funded by 
providing that if program losses exceeded participation fees, the difference would be funded 
via a special assessment on all FDIC-insured institutions (whether or not they had actually 
participated in the program). In Sweden, the government seeded the stability fund backing 
its guarantee program with approximately €1.5 billion (intended to amount to 0.5% of GDP), 
but levied stability-fund fees on all financial institutions in proportion to their balance sheet 
sizes to pay back this initial contribution and ultimately build the fund up to 2.5% of GDP. In 
Denmark, the government ultimately replaced an Original Guarantee Scheme involving a 
significant role for a banking industry group called PCA in the design, funding, and execution 
of the program with a New Guarantee Scheme in which the PCA was less central. The New 
Guarantee Scheme, for example, charged participating institutions a fee directly as compared 
with the Original Guarantee Scheme’s approach of allocating a certain amount of program 
losses to the PCA that it then allocated to individual institutions.    
Program Issuance Window  
The guarantee programs adopted during the GFC were intended to be temporary measures 
to address what was hoped would be relatively short-lived disruptions in wholesale funding 
markets. Accordingly, at the time of introduction, they typically included initial windows for 
issuing guaranteed debt that were around six months to one year long. However, 
policymakers generally recognized “the…unpredictable duration of the fundamental 
shortcomings in the functioning of financial markets” (to borrow the language of the EC’s 
guidance of October 25, 2008) and allowed for some ability to extend these initial windows. 
As illustrated in Table 8 below, most programs made use of this ability, even several that had 
not seen any guaranteed issuances prior to extension. Many of these extensions took place 
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Source: Author analysis. Reflects initial termination of issuance window. Does not account for 
programs later reintroduced in response to new difficulties. 
By May 2009, market conditions had begun to become much more favorable, and the 
issuance windows for many programs were allowed to expire in late 2009 into early 2010. 
By April 2010, the EC had concluded that “access to funding [was] no longer a systematic and 
generalized problem” such that programs extended beyond June 30, 2010, should be 
subjected to additional requirements to address distortions and move remaining guaranteed 
issuers closer to market conditions. These requirements included the fee increases outlined 
in the “Fees” section above and a mandatory long-term viability review for banks that 
remained heavy users of guarantees (European Commission 2010). As shown in Table 8 
above, a small number of jurisdictions (particularly some of those hard hit by the European 
sovereign debt crisis) have continued extending their issuance window expiration dates. 
Others (Italy, Spain) reintroduced versions of their programs in 2011-2012 in response to 
the sovereign debt crisis. 
Two unique approaches to issuance window expiration dates are worth highlighting: 
• Australia intentionally did not announce an issuance window expiration date at the 
time of the program’s introduction in order to avoid the risk of premature closure 
and to communicate a commitment to keeping the program running as long as 
necessary 
• The United Kingdom’s Credit Guarantee Scheme allowed for the continued rolling 
over of some guaranteed debt after the issuance window expiration date (debt equal 
to up to one-third the program’s total size) 
III. Evaluation 
Any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the guarantee programs adopted during the GFC 
faces significant challenges. As noted above, countries often introduced these programs as 
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one component of broader packages of measures, and it can be difficult to disentangle the 
effects of the guarantees from the effects of other parallel measures. Existing evaluations of 
GFC guarantee programs have been generally positive, albeit generally written by central 
bank economists with a stake in the outcome. This survey synthesizes the evidence on 
guarantee program effectiveness by seeking to answer two primary questions: 
1. Were the programs effective at achieving their goals? 
2. Did the programs have any unintended consequences?  
Achievement of Goals 
Grande et al. (2011) identify support for bank funding to avoid a liquidity crisis and support 
for bank lending to avoid a credit crunch as the twin objectives of the guarantee programs 
generally. To this can be added the goal of restoring confidence in beneficiary banks more 
broadly (i.e., not just in their guaranteed debt). This results in three specific sub-questions 
to be answered in evaluating whether guarantee programs were effective in achieving their 
goals: 
a. Were participating banks able to borrow? 
b. Was confidence restored in participating banks more broadly? 
c. Did participating banks resume lending? 
On the question of bank borrowing, Levy and Schich (2010) argue that “[t]here appears to 
be widespread agreement that, on the whole, government guarantees have…allow[ed] banks 
to tap funds on the markets and roll over their maturing debt at a time when traditional 
sources of funding were drying up.” In a conclusion echoed by other sources, Grande et al. 
(2011) find that “[t]he available evidence…suggests that debt guarantees did help banks to 
resume medium-term funding.” Citing analysis from the BIS and IMF, the European 
Commission (2011) also noted that the announcement of state aid programs including (but 
not limited to) guarantees and their use had a positive (if somewhat temporary) effect on 
broader confidence in banks as measured by their CDS spreads. Meanwhile, Grande et al. 
(2011) found a “broadly positive” relationship between issuance of guaranteed bonds and 
lending growth by banks, suggesting that participating banks did in fact resume lending. 
Unintended Consequences 
One possible unintended consequence of guarantee programs could be the “crowding out” 
of non-guaranteed debt by guaranteed debt (i.e., the issuance of guaranteed debt in place of 
non-guaranteed debt that would otherwise have been issued). Panetta et al. (2009) have 
studied the extent to which this actually occurred during the GFC. They find that while 
crowding out does not appear to have been a significant issue in the United States and most 
of Europe, increased issuance of guaranteed debt in the United Kingdom from January to 
April 2009 was associated with a decline in non-guaranteed issuance. Crowding out may also 
have occurred specifically in the covered bond market in countries including Spain and 
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France (Ibid.). As noted above, other European countries perceived the exclusion of covered 
bonds from Denmark’s Original Guarantee Scheme as having dried up the market for such 
bonds.   
Work by Panetta et al. (2009) and others illustrates why Europe’s attempt to create a level 
playing field by promoting the standardization of fees across countries produced significant 
market distortions as another unintended consequence. Using a regression analysis on 321 
guaranteed issuances, Panetta et al. calculated how much of a hypothetical spread on a 
guaranteed bond can be attributed to various factors categorized as being either country-
specific (e.g., sovereign creditworthiness, size of bank rescue packages as a percentage of 
GDP, etc.), bank-specific (e.g., bank creditworthiness), or issue-specific (maturity, currency, 
etc.). As illustrated in Figure 4 below, more than half of the total spread was driven by 
country-specific factors, with the creditworthiness of the sovereign and the timeliness of 
reimbursement under the guarantee upon default being the two most significant 
considerations. 





Source: Panetta et al. 2009. 
Panetta et al.’s finding with respect to this latter factor confirm the anecdotal evidence seen 
during the crisis—several countries improved the timeliness of their guarantee payments 
upon default (as described in Key Design Decisions above), likely in hopes of bolstering 
program usage. 
With respect to the former factor, the finding that sovereign creditworthiness is the single 
most important consideration in determining the effect of guarantee programs on spreads 
underlines perhaps the most significant flaw in the design of guarantee programs during the 
GFC. As discussed in Key Design Decisions above, in the interest of maintaining a level 
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playing field, the EC and ECB encouraged countries to adopt an identical approach to 
guarantee program participation fees. However, because sovereign creditworthiness varied 
significantly across countries, similarly situated issuers in different jurisdictions would find 
themselves paying the same fee for guarantees worth very different amounts in terms of the 
reduction in spreads/improvement in borrowing costs that resulted. This produced 
significant distortions. As described by Levy and Schich (2010) and others, weak banks with 
strong sovereigns were able to borrow at lower total cost than strong banks with weak 
sovereigns. This dynamic became even more pronounced beginning in 2010, as sovereign 
creditworthiness further deteriorated in some countries with the onset of the Eurozone 
crisis. Thus, for example, A+ rated banks in Portugal would have to pay a much higher 
interest rate on their guaranteed debt (90-100 basis points above the swap rate) than BBB+ 
rated banks in Germany (less than 20 basis points above the swap rate) (Panetta et al. 2009).  
The low value of the guarantee, given sovereign creditworthiness concerns, may have been 
a factor in the non-usage of programs in countries such as Italy, Hungary, and Poland. Some 
countries with sovereign creditworthiness concerns such as Spain and Portugal nonetheless 
saw significant issuance of guaranteed debt. Even here, however, the identities of those 
issuing guaranteed debt is telling. In Spain, guaranteed issuance was heavy but restricted to 
smaller, local institutions for whom no other options appear to have been available. By 
comparison, Banco Bilbao (one of Spain’s largest banks) chose to issue guaranteed debt via 
its BBB+ Puerto Rican subsidiary rather than its AA-rated Spanish parent because the former 
was eligible for the United States’ guarantee program. Caamaño Alegre and Komilova (2013) 
noted that Spain’s guarantee program was relatively expensive because of the country’s low 
sovereign credit rating. The approach to guarantee program fees adopted in Europe thus 
failed to meet its stated objective of maintaining a level playing field.  That said, as noted 
above, two potential solutions to this failure would have been politically difficult: (a) making 
the value of guarantees consistent across countries (e.g., by using a multi-lateral body to 
provide them) and (b) making fees reflect the value of guarantees by having “weak” 
sovereigns charge less than “strong” sovereigns. 
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